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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

A-146936

TO : Assistant Director  
Office of Research & Reports  
FROM : Charles R. Norberg *CRN*  
Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff  
SUBJECT: IFIS Staff Study on Organizational Limitations

DATE: Dec. 22, 1950

For your information, attached hereto is an IFIS Staff Study  
on organizational limitations within the Executive Branch of the  
U.S. Government.

Attachment.

Staff Study dated 12/9/50.

IFIS:CRNorberg:veo

DEC 22 1950  
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State Dept. review completed

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December 9, 1950

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, Interdepartmental Foreign Information  
Organization

FROM: Acting Chairman, Interdepartmental Foreign  
Information Staff. *G. E. O.*

There is transmitted herewith an IFIS staff study on organizational limitations within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government inhibiting effective and systematic propaganda and psychological planning in support of national aims.

This study represents the views of IFIS members, and has not been coordinated with staff sections within the departments which those members represent.

The Staff would welcome an opportunity to discuss this problem with you.

Enc.

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IFOS STAFF STUDY

THE PROBLEM

1. To study the organizational limitations within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government inhibiting effective and systematic propaganda and psychological planning in support of national aims in the current crisis.

2. To make basic recommendations which will aid in overcoming those limitations.

DISCUSSION

3. It has been long apparent that fundamental changes in the organization of the Department of State were needed for the performance of planning functions in the field of propaganda. (Department of State members non-concur in this observation and feel that study should also be devoted to organizational arrangements in other U.S. departments and agencies.) This problem divides itself into two categories: first, lack at the present time of an organizational structure within either IFIO, IFIS, or P/POL adequate to provide for complete and systematic performance of their functions and responsibilities; second, an organizational position within the government too far from the sources of strategic and political thinking either to contribute timely advice or to receive timely guidance. (Department of State members non-concur in the second clause of this sentence.)

4. The Staff recognizes that our democratic form of Government and our cultural heritage impose limitations to planning and use of propaganda as an instrument of national policy. Because it is not in

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the American tradition to view peace and war as a continuum, there is an arbitrary division of responsibility for peace and for war between the Department of State and the Department of Defense which imposes upon an interdepartmental organization such as IPIS (and IPJO) the burden of continually re-examining and re-arguing the distinctions of responsibility for planning in the fields of propaganda and psychological warfare.

5. Despite these fundamental limitations to planning, it is believed that the seriousness of the present international conflict and the present mood of American public opinion suggest the possibility that some organizational steps can be taken now to provide for a more systematic and effective contribution to the psychological and propaganda aspects of national planning and policy formulation.

6. The contribution which the planner of propaganda and psychological strategy can make at the national level includes the following:

a. Provision for comprehensiveness of plans.

Under this category he can assure that all national policies stemming from either National Security Council decision and papers or from foreign policy decisions are supported by complete and correlated plans which utilize to the fullest the latest fruits of scientific research. In addition, he can assure that plans are prepared in support of national values, aims, and ideology.

b. Analysis of the psychological, prestige and moral aspects of impending decisions in periods of crisis.

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c. Systematic influence of foreign emotions, attitudes and behavior in the interest of U.S. national aims.

d. Integration of the psychological element with the political, military and economic elements of national action.

7. It is felt that there has been a failure to recognize fully the need for comprehensive planning in this field or to take adequate steps to remedy this deficiency, including the creation of a strong organization necessary for this purpose. We believe that a task of such national importance demands the systematic application of the greatest intellectual resources of our country. We believe that present practices do not indicate adequate recognition of the magnitude, complexity, or the scale of conception which this task imposes.

8. The chief organizational needs of the propagandist which will permit him to make that contribution are:

a. Ready access to those who make governmental decisions. This was demonstrated in the last war. Whereas the British provided for direct access of the Political Warfare Executive to the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Information, the Director of OWI had but intermittent contact with the President and his chief advisors.

b. An internal organizational structure to support him by systematic comprehensive planning.

c. Official and ready access to highest level governmental papers, including NSC reports necessary to comprehensive and timely planning.\*

\* Members of the NSC staff have repeatedly made efforts to obtain NSC papers through official channels, with limited success.

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d. Access to all scientific skills needed to provide adequate advice in planning.

~~CONCLUSIONS~~

9. The present organizational structure does not adequately meet these needs.

a. Although the Director of IFIC has direct access to the Secretary of State, it is felt that present organizational arrangements do not enable him to maintain all necessary day-to-day contacts at the highest governmental level.

b. P/POL and IFIS are not at present systematically reorganized to fulfill all the functions and responsibilities devolving upon national propaganda planners and information policy advisors.

c. P/POL and IFIS are greatly inadequate in number of personnel to perform these functions and responsibilities, the magnitude and intricacy of which demand staffs of a different order of size.

10. There are basic reasons for U.S. organizational and planning weaknesses which are not attributable to individual planning failures.

a. The basic structure of our government is not readily adaptable to giving national propaganda its proper place.

b. Within and without our government, there is an all-pervasive lack of a proper conception of the power basis of international politics and the fact that war and peace are a continuum.

c.

VIEW A

Within the Department of State there is a widely felt lack of belief in the applicability of planning procedures to this field. (Army, Navy, and Air Force)

VIEW B

Within the Government, there is still a lack of belief in some quarters in the applicability of planning procedures to this field. (State and CIA)

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11.

**VIEW A**

The organizational recommendations which are made herein are based upon the premise that responsibility in this field will remain with the Department of State, and are without prejudice to the status or future of NSC-74 and NSC-74/2, (Department of State position on NSC-74) (State, Army, and CIA)

**VIEN B**

The organizational recommendations which are made herein are based upon the premise that responsibility in this field will remain with the Department of State during time of peace, and are without prejudice to the status or future of NSC-74 and NSC-74/2, (Department of State position on NSC-74) (Navy and Air Force)

12. The following recommendations are made with respect to the internal organization of P/POL and IFIO (including IFIS):

VIEW A

a. (1) P/POL and IFIS should each be organized into staff sub-divisions which provide for the execution of all responsibilities assigned to those staffs. This means with respect to IFIS that it should cease operating as a committee and should be organized along the lines indicated in Enclosure A of IFIS-5, August 4, 1950, (attached) which has been approved by IFIO as a basis for further planning.

(2) Members of IFES should act as experts rather than as representatives.

(3) R/POL should likewise provide for a functional division of responsibilities to insure that its planning is projected further into the future than at present. (Army and CIA)

VIEW B

a. IFIO and that portion of P/POI responsible for the formulation of policy should be organized as a matter of urgency\* into a staff which provides for the execution of all responsibilities indicated under the general concept of Enclosure A, IFIS-5, August 4, 1950, (attached).\*\*

\* Underlined for emphasis.

\*\* Since Par. 12, Sec. b, c, d <sup>are</sup> in consonance with VIEW B above, no split view is presented on the remainder of Par. 12.

(Navy and Air Force)

V L R V C

3. The FBI and AFIS should be so organized as to be able to discharge functions generally along the lines of those in FBI, Enclosures 1, 1E 5-5, amended to conform to NSC-74/2, so as to apply the "psychological objectives" activities, e.g., dances, etc." rather than to "psychological warfare objectives, etc."

(2) HIS  
should cease  
operating as a  
committee and  
its members should  
be re-elected  
to the Board  
of Directors. YES.

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b. Both P/POL and IFIS should provide means for systematically bringing the research specialists into close touch with the planners. Funds must therefore be provided for the utilization of research consultants, including making interdepartmental arrangements for putting at the disposal of IFIS and P/POL the research skills of agencies such as IAD and CRO.

c. The staffs of both P/POL and IFIS must be greatly increased:

- (1) In order to reduce lost time through endless arguments as to priorities.
- (2) To fulfill their responsibilities in a comprehensive and systematic way.

d. Both P/POL and IFIS should make provision for planning to achieve calculated psychological effects.

e. IFIO should as far as possible:

- (1) Keep IFIS more fully informed of its current business;
- (2) Use IFIS continuously for the preparation of studies, plans or other papers necessary to the conduct of current business.

13. The following recommendations are made with respect to organizational position within the Department of State:

a.

VIEW A

IFIO, including IFIS, should be placed at the Under Secretary level where both IFIO and IFIS members can be in day-to-day contact with those persons responsible for formulating the basic foreign policy thinking. (Army and CIA)

VIEW B

The organization recommended in VIEW B, Par. 12, a., should be placed at the Under Secretary level where both IFIO and IFIS members can be in day-to-day contact with those persons responsible for formulating the basic foreign policy thinking.

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(Department of State members do not concur in these views.)



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b. (1)

VIEW A

The Director of INFO should be enabled to participate at the highest governmental level in the formulation of policy decisions related to the national psychological and foreign information programs.

(Army and CIA)

VIEW B

The Director of the organization indicated above should be enabled to participate at the highest governmental level in the formulation of policy decisions related to the national psychological and foreign information programs.

(Navy and Air Force)

(Department of State members do not concur in these views.)

- (2) In view of the critical seriousness of the international situation, the Director should be full time and should report directly to the Secretary of State.  
(Department of State members do not concur in his recommendation.)

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REMARKS:

*This reveals a situation in which it would be unwise to make any unilateral or State-CIA bilateral decisions.* *[Signature]*

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